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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STANLEY L. WADE# 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ] 
vs. ; 
F. C. STANGL III, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
\ Case No. 920221-CA 
i Priority No. 16 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STANLEY L. WADE 
INTRODUCTION 
This brief is being submitted on behalf of Appellant Stanley 
L. Wade (hereinafter "Wade"). The purpose for this brief is to 
respond to matters raised in the brief filed by Appellee, F. C. 
Stangl III (hereinafter "Appellee Brief") 
In this brief, Wade incorporates the facts and arguments set 
outlined in his original brief and will expressly limit his 
response to the arguments of Appellee, F. C. Stangl III 
(hereinafter "Stangl"). 
While Stangl has introduced several issues which this court 
must consider, nonetheless, Wade believes the facts are 
1 
sufficiently stated in its Appellant Brief, so appropriate 
responses will be made in the argument portions of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
STANGL'S OBJECTIONS TO EXHIBITS UTILIZED IN WADE'S 
APPELLANT BRIEF ARE PARTIALLY INCORRECT AND OTHERWISE 
IRRELEVANT 
Stangl objects to five exhibits. Two of these and part of a 
third were, in fact, admitted into evidence by the trial court. 
The remaining issues are proved by other admitted evidence. 
POINT II, 
WADES' ALLEGED DEFAULT IN FAILING TO REPLY TO STANGL'S 
COUNTERCLAIM IS IRRELEVANT TO THIS ACTION 
The central issue before the trial court and before this 
Court on appeal is what constituted Wade's share of property 
taxes. This issue was not involved in Stangl's counterclaim and 
therefore was not defaulted. 
POINT III, 
STANGL'S ARGUMENT THAT THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL BIAS SHOWN 
BY THE JUDGE IN THIS CASE IGNORES THE EVIDENCE 
Judicial rulings which are erroneous, numerous, and 
continuous, coupled with other evidence of bias establish 
prejudicial bias. Such rulings and evidence were so prevalent in 
this case thcLt Wade was unable to obtain a fair trial. Such bias 
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requires this Court to remand Wade's case for a new trial before 
an impartial judge. 
POINT IV. 
STANGL'S CONTENTION THAT THE COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED 
THE ISSUES OF AN ALLEGED ORAL CONTRACT AND ORAL 
MODIFICATION OF THE CONTRACT DISREGARDS APPLICABLE LAW 
The admission of new issues at trial under Rule 15(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is allowed only when the parties 
consent and the issue is fully tried. Two new issues were 
introduced by Stangl at trial without either of these 
requirements being met. Wade did not impliedly or expressly 
consent to the introduction of the issues. Further, the issues 
were not fully tried because the trial court prevented Wade from 
introducing crucial defense arguments. 
POINT V, 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE PARTIES1 
INTENT WITH RESPECT TO THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT WAS TO 
APPORTION TAXES BASED UPON THE AMOUNT OF AREA OWNED BY 
EACH PARTY 
Stangl's statement of proper standards of review contends 
that the trial court's finding of intent must be upheld unless 
clearly erroneous. This statement is incorrect. Because the 
court's finding of intent was based upon documentary evidence it 
should be considered a legal conclusion and reviewed for 
correctness. 
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Even if the trial court's finding was a finding of fact, it 
was not based upon competent or substantial evidence and was 
clearly erroneous. 
Stangl also claims that the court's finding of intent is 
supported by the doctrine of practical construction. However, 
practical construction requires that both parties construe the 
contract the same. This requirement was not met in this case and 
therefore the doctrine does not support the court's finding. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE THE PROPER 
ALLOCATION OF TAXES UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE 
CONVERSION 
The trial court's reliance upon an alleged oral contract or 
oral modification of the original contract, or upon the parties 
alleged intent under the original contract was improper. The 
trial court was required to follow the Supreme Court's 
instructions to determine the amount of taxes which had actually 
accrued to the property under the doctrine of equitable 
conversion. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
STANGL'S OBJECTIONS TO EXHIBITS UTILIZED IN WADE'S 
APPELLANT BRIEF ARE PARTIALLY INCORRECT AND OTHERWISE 
IRRELEVANT 
In his statement of the facts, Stangl contends that Exhibits 
A, B# E# I and K of Wade's Appellant Brief were not introduced 
into evidence at trial. Appellee Brief, p. 7. This is partially 
incorrect and otherwise irrelevant. 
Exhibit A, Wade's March 25, 1990 affidavit, was admitted by 
the court into evidence. Tr. p. 75. Exhibit B, the Supreme 
Court's Remittitur, was admitted into evidence. Tr. p. 45. The 
first of three parts of Exhibit K, Schwenke's Affidavit, was 
admitted into evidence. Tr. p. 79. 
The admissibility of the remaining exhibits to which Stangl 
objects does not affect the arguments made by Wade. The purposes 
for which Wade utilized Exhibit's E, I and the second and third 
parts of exhibit K are met by other evidence admitted at trial. 
Exhibit E, Partial Satisfaction of Judgment, July 6, 1992, 
was used on pages seven and nine to show that Wade has paid 
Stangl $106,386.97 in taxes, interest and fees. This fact is not 
essential to any argument made by Wade. 
Exhibit I, Stangl's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, was utilized on page eight to 
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establish that Stangl calculated the allocation of taxes based 
upon proportionate acreage. This fact is reflected in the 
transcript• See, e.g.. Tr. 22, 
The second and third parts of Exhibit K# a page from Wade's 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
and a property valuation statement from the Salt Lake County 
Assessor's office, were used on page 19 to show the proportion of 
taxes which Wade was paying. These proportions are also 
established by the transcript. The proportion of acreage is set 
forth on page 56 as 70%. The proportion of value is easily 
established by comparing the values identified at trial of 
$206,100 for Wade's property and $251,000 for Stangl's property. 
Tr. pp. 53-54. Based upon these figures, Wade's parcel 
constituted 45% of the value of the aggregated parcel and 
Stangl's constituted 55%. These results are sufficiently close 
to those cited from Schwenke's Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment to not alter the 
arguments. 
POINT II. 
WADES' ALLEGED DEFAULT IN FAILING TO REPLY TO STANGL'S 
COUNTERCLAIM IS IRRELEVANT TO THIS ACTION 
Stangl argues that the trial court's judgment must be 
affirmed in all respects based upon the court's finding that Wade 
6 
was in default r e l a t i v e to the issues raised in Stangl's original 
counterclaim. Appellee Brief, p. 16. This argument i s without 
merit. The issue before the t r i a l court was what constituted 
Wade's share of the property taxes. This issue was not addressed 
in the counterclaim and therefore was not defaulted.1 
Stangl attempts to convince th is Court that the t r i a l 
court's finding of defaul t formed an independent and "separate 
basis" for the court's e n t i r e judgment.2 However, the court's 
finding of default was made only to establ ish that Wade did in 
fact owe his share of t axes . Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, p. 8, #15 (See Appellate Brief Exhibit C). The central 
issue of what cons t i tu ted Wade's share of the taxes was the 
subject of ent ire ly separate findings to ta l ly unrelated to the 
above-mentioned de fau l t . Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, pp. 4-6, #7-9 and 11 (See Appellate Brief Exhibit C). 
Therefore, the c o u r t ' s finding of default was not an independent 
basis for i t s judgment. 
Stang l ' s counte rc la im sought 1) d ismissal of Wade's Complaint with 
prejudice; 2) reimbursement of Wade's share of the property taxes and i n t e r e s t 
thereon at the l e g a l r a t e , and 3) a t t o r n e y s f e e s and c o s t s . Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, p . 8, #15 (See Appellate Brief Exhibit C). 
2
 Stangl s t a t e s t h a t " in accordance with the t r i a l cour t ' s f indings , 
the judgment against Wade should be affirmed in a l l respects because of Wade's 
f a i l u r e t o reply t o t he counterc la im against him.11 Appellee Brief , p . 16. 
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POINT III, 
STANGL'S ARGUMENT THAT THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL BIAS 
SHOWN BY THE JUDGE IN THIS CASE IGNORES THE EVIDENCE 
The evidence of judicial bias was so extensive in this case 
that the case should be remanded for a new trial. The judge 
himself raised the issue of recusal based upon bias sua sponte 
because he was aware there were problems which could affect his 
judgment. This creates a sufficient concern to require this 
court to "carefully scrutinize the record to see that no 
injustice has been done. . . "3 48A C.J.S. § 108, p. 730. 
Stangl argues that such prejudicial bias cannot be 
considered by this Court because Wade's attorney failed to object 
at trial. However, counsel's failure to object at trial may be 
excused when necessary to prevent a "manifest injustice." State 
v. Becker, 803 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. 
John. 770 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 1989). Failing to allow an appeal 
based upon judicial bias would cause such a manifest injustice. 
Wade's counsel at trial was new to the case and was unaware of 
the prior difficulties between the judge and Wade's previous 
attorney's. If he had been aware of the history of the case, he 
would unquestionably have objected to the judge's handling of the 
matter. As it was, Wade's counsel consented to the judge's 
3
 People Ex rel. Little v. Saint Louis Merchants' Bridge Co.. 118 N.E. 
733 (111. 1918); Aldridae v. State, 342 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1960). 
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continued handling of the case on the assumption that the prior 
difficulties would not extend to a bias against Wade himself. 
"Manifest injustice" requires that the error be obvious to 
the trial court and that it affect the substantial rights of a 
party. State v. Becker. 803 P.2d at 1293 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
There was extensive and obvious evidence of judicial bias in this 
case, as a brief review of the facts of the case shows. 
The trial judge allowed Stangl to introduce crucial new 
issues for the first time at trial. However, he then refused to 
allow Wade to rebut the issues on the grounds that the defenses 
had not been raised previously. (A full discussion is included 
in Wade's Appellate brief, pp. 15-22.) 
The judge ignored Supreme Court statements that the contract 
did not impose any contractual duty upon Wade to pay taxes. 
Instead, the judge found Wade liable for taxes specifically based 
upon an alleged contractual agreement, or contractual intent. 
The judge failed to apportion taxes under the doctrine of 
equitable conversion as instructed by the Supreme Court. 
Instead, the judge based his determination of tax apportionment 
upon Stangl's calculations of proportionate acreage, which failed 
to account for the significantly higher value of Stangl's 
property. 
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In determining to discredit Wade's testimony, the judge 
leaned heavily on comments pertaining to a prior fraud proceeding 
Wade had been involved in. He used his disbelief of Wade's 
testimony to justify his decision that the parties contractual 
intent or agreement was to allocate taxes based upon acreage. 
Such information should not have been relevant to the case. 
According to the Supreme Court, the issue was what portion of the 
taxes actually accrued to Wade's land, an issue of valuation, not 
credibility or intent. 
The judge was aware of evidence that Wade's prior counsel, 
Schwenke, had altered a $52,000 check received from Stangl for 
Wade and cashed it himself. Tr. p. 42. The judge seemed to 
believe that Schwenke had forged dates on court documents. Tr. 
pp. 44, 45. He was aware that Schwenke had been suspended from 
the bar. Letter from A. Paul Schwenke to Judge Michael Murphy, 
dated November 15, 1990, Court Record, Vol. II, p. 550; Letter 
from Judge Michael Murphy to A. Paul Schwenke, dated November 27, 
1990, Court Record, Vol. II, p. 551. There was no evidence that 
Wade receiv€id the money, and it was questionable whether Schwenke 
was still representing Wade at the time he received the check. 
Tr. pp. 43-48. Notwithstanding the character of Schwenke and the 
lack of evidence that Wade had received the check, the judge 
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found that Schwenke was Wade's agent for purposes of receiving 
$52,000. 
In addition to being obvious to the trial court, the 
judicial bias in this case unquestionably affected substantial 
rights. Judicial bias resulted in Wade being held liable for a 
much greater portion of taxes than he would have been under a 
determination based upon the law. 
As stated in Wade's appellate brief, "[a] litigant is 
entitled to a trial before a judge who is not biased or 
prejudiced. . ." 48A C.J.S. § 108, p. 728. A judge is required 
to recuse himself when his impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned. ABA Code of Jud.Conduct Canon 3, subd. C(l)(b). 
Stangl cites a case stating that "[t]he rulings of a judge, even 
if erroneous, numerous, and continuous[,] are not sufficient in 
themselves to show bias or prejudice." Appellee Brief, p. 21, 
citing Riva Ridge Apartments v. Robert G. Fisher Co.. Inc., 745 
P.2d 1034, 1037 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis added). However, 
not only were numerous judicial rulings in this case erroneous, 
but there were also statements made by the judge himself 
regarding potential biases as a result of problems with prior 
counsel. In short, there was more than sufficient evidence of a 
lack of judicial impartiality to require the judge to recuse 
himself from handling the case. 
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The agency issue is of particular concern. As mentioned 
above, at the beginning of the trial, the judge recused himself 
from deciding an issue on the grounds that it was "intrinsically 
intertwined with prior counsel for [Wade]." Tr. p. 2. The issue 
regarding the $52#000 check was also unquestionably intertwined 
with prior counsel and the judge should have again recused 
himself from deciding this issue, at the least. 
POINT IV, 
STANGL'S CONTENTION THAT THE COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED 
THE ISSUES OF AN ALLEGED ORAL CONTRACT AND ORAL 
MODIFICATION OF THE CONTRACT DISREGARDS APPLICABLE LAW 
As discussed extensively in Wade's Appellate Brief, two of 
the three grounds upon which the trial court rested in reaching 
its judgment were improperly admitted for the first time at 
trial.4 Stangl attempts to counter this fact on the grounds that 
Wade failed to object at trial to the new issues. However, as 
explained in Wade's Appellate Brief, failure to object cannot 
constitute consent to try a new issue where the party had no 
reason to know that a new issue was being introduced. See Wade's 
Appellate Brief, pp. 16-18. 
Specifically, the issues of an oral contract or oral modification of 
the contract creating an obligation to apportion taxes based upon proportionate 
acreage. See Appellate Brief, pp. 16-18. 
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Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that a new issue can only be introduced at trial where the 
parties consent and the issue is fully tried• Neither of these 
requirements were met in this case.5 
Stangl attempts to argue that the issue of an oral contract 
was tried with Wade's express consent because Wade utilized 
testimony regarding "oral agreements11 throughout the trial and in 
his closing. Appellee Brief, pp. 25-27. This contention is 
without merit. Wade utilized evidence pertaining to alleged oral 
agreements because they applied to the issue of the parties' 
intent under the contract. His use of testimony pertaining to 
these alleged conversations was never applied to any discussion 
of an oral contract or oral modification because he never 
realized those issues had been introduced. 
Stangl contends that the issues of an oral contract or 
modification were fully tried. The relevant test is "whether the 
opposing party had a fair opportunity to defend and whether it 
could offer additional evidence if the case were retried on a 
different theory." Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987), citing R. A, Pohl Constr. Co. v. Marshall. 640 F.2d 
266, 267 (CA10 1981). In this case, Wade could have introduced 
5
 These issues were extensively briefed in Wade's Appellate Brief and 
will only be summarily reviewed as they pertain to specific points raised by 
Stangl's Appellee Brief. See. Appellate Brief, pp. 15-18. 
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evidence, and in fact tried to introduce evidence, to prove that 
the statute of frauds and the statute of limitations barred these 
new issues. Thus, the Colman test was not met and these issues 
were not fully tried. See Appellate Brief, pp. 16-18 for a full 
discussion. 
Stangl also contends that the statute of frauds and statute 
of limitations defenses were properly excluded by the court as 
they had not been raised previously. He points to the fact that 
Wade conceded at trial that the statute of frauds and statute of 
limitations defenses applied only if they had been raised 
previously. Appellee Brief, p. 26. However, Wade's comment 
only, again, emphasizes the fact that he was unaware new issues 
had been introduced. He thought the defenses applied to the 
existing issue of the parties' intent. If that had been the 
case, the defenses would have been waived if not pleaded 
previously. In actuality, because Stangl did not raise the 
issues of an oral contract or an oral modification of the 
contract prior to trial, the defenses could not have been pleaded 
earlier and were not waived. 
In sum, the requirements of Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure for the introduction of a new issue were not met 
and the issues were improperly admitted. Wade did not impliedly 
consent to the introduction of the two new issues, and was 
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prevented from introducing evidence crucial to defending the 
issues* 
POINT V, 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE PARTIES' 
INTENT WITH RESPECT TO THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT WAS TO 
APPORTION TAXES BASED UPON THE AMOUNT OF AREA OWNED BY 
EACH PARTY 
Stangl argues that the court's determination of the parties' 
intent under the contract is a finding of fact, subject only to 
limited review and reversible only when clearly erroneous. This 
statement is incorrect. Because the court's finding of an intent 
to allocate taxes based upon acreage was specifically based upon 
documentary evidence6, its findings should be considered legal 
conclusions and subject to review for correctness. Further, even 
if the decision was a finding of fact, this Court must review the 
findings to determine if they were "based on substantial, 
competent, admissible evidence." Finally, even under a clearly 
erroneous standard, the trial court's decision was wrong. 
A. The Trial Court's Finding of Intent Was a Legal 
Finding. Subject to Review for Correctness 
A judgement based upon written documents, such as this one, 
should be subject to review for correctness, just as conclusions 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp. 4-5, #8 and 9, (See 
Appellate Brief Exhibit C). 
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based upon written contracts are. Interpretations of contract 
language present an appellate court with a question of law which 
is reviewed for correctness. Bettinger v. Bettincrer, 793 P.2d 
389 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), citing Regional Sales Agency. Inc. v. 
Reichert. 784 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). This 
standard is appropriate because an appellate court is capable of 
considering the contents of a written contract and is not 
required to evaluate the credibility of witnesses or other 
information not directly available on appeal. This capability is 
equally present where a trial court finding is based upon other 
types of written documents. Thus, findings based upon such 
evidence should be subject to this same standard of review. 
B. The Trial Court's Finding of Intent Was Not Based 
Upon Competent or Substantial Information and Was 
Clearly Erroneous 
Even if the trial court's finding of an intent to allocate 
taxes based upon acreage is not subject to review for 
correctness, the finding was still wrong. Appellate courts are 
required to review findings and determine if they are "based on 
substantial, competent, admissible evidence." Bettinger v. 
Bettinaer. 793 P.2d at 392, (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The finding of 
intent in this case was not based upon such evidence. Further, 
its finding was clearly erroneous. All of the evidence available 
16 
to the trial court relevant to this issue, taken together, fails 
to reasonably support the trial court's finding. 
The evidence available to the court pertaining to the issue 
of intent included: letters sent from Stangl to Wade reflecting 
his calculations of apportionment based upon acreage7; testimony 
from Wade pertaining to three conversations between himself and 
Stangl wherein he let Stangl know apportionment based upon 
acreage was unacceptable8; testimony from Stangl pertaining to 
one of those conversations wherein he claims Wade agreed to such 
apportionment9; and three checks written by Wade after 1978 for 
taxes10. 
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the 
trial court's finding of intent, if the court credited only 
Stangl's testimony pertaining to the parties' discussion of taxes 
and found that the three checks written by Wade were evidence of 
an agreement, it could have reached the conclusion it did. 
However, such reliance would be clearly erroneous as against the 
weight of the evidence. 
Tr. pp. 22-23. 
Tr. pp. 65-67. 
Tr. pp. 11-13, and 36. 
Tr. p. 89. 
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The letters written by Stangl cannot show a joint intent to 
allocate taxes based upon acreage because there was no indication 
in any of these that Wade consented to the apportionment. 
Thus, these letters are not "competent11 evidence to support the 
court's finding and do not satisfy the Bettinger test. 
Bettinaer. 793 P.2d at 392, (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Placing heavy emphasis upon testimony introduced by Stangl 
pertaining to one conversation in which Wade allegedly agreed to 
allocate taxes based upon acreage is clearly unreasonable. The 
alleged agreement purported to make Wade responsible for 70% of 
the taxes, when his property was valued at only 45% of the value 
of the combined property. See p. 2 for computation. Such 
testimony introduced by Stangl is clearly self-serving. Self-
serving declarations of a party cannot establish the liability of 
another party. 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 216; White v. Delano. 665 
S.W.2d 67, 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); TfrUert Tppl fr Eng'g, CP,, 
Inc.. v. McClain, 579 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); 
National Importing & Trading Co. v. E.A. Bear & Co.. 155 N.E. 343 
(111. 1925). Thus, the court's reliance upon this evidence would 
be clearly erroneous. 
The three checks arguably support the trial court's finding 
that the parties originally intended to apportion taxes based 
upon relative acreage. However, this evidence is hardly 
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"substantial", as required by Bettinger. Bettinaer. 793 P. 2d at 
392, (Utah Ct. App. 1990). This i s especial ly true where th is 
finding goes d i r e c t l y against the testimony of both witnesses and 
the court's own f inding tha t the parties original intent was to 
have the properties separately assessed by the taxing authorit ies 
based upon value. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp. 
3-4, #6 (See Appellate Brief Exhibit C); Tr. p. 11. 
Further, payment of three checks i s consistent with Wade's 
bel ie f that the property would soon be divided for tax purposes 
as orig inal ly intended by the part ies . The checks were written 
on the mistaken assumption that Stangl would have the properties 
separated for tax purposes. Payment on the basis of acreage was 
meant to be a temporary measure and was never intended to 
prospectively resolve the issue of a l locat ion. 
If the court r e l i e d upon the existence of the three checks 
to support Stangl ' s testimony, i t again re l ied upon sel f -serving 
evidence. The checks were written on the basis of acreage only 
because of Stangl ' s f a i l u r e to perform as intended by the 
parties11 . The t r i a l c o u r t ' s reliance upon such evidence i s 
Throughout S tangl ' s Appellee Brief, he states that the "taxing 
authority fai led to segregate the two parcels of property for assessment 
purposes." Appellee Brief pp. 6, 9, 24, 33. However, the only reason the taxing 
authorities did not separate the properties was because Stangl did not request 
them to do so. See Tr. p . 57. Stangl could have, at any time over the nine years 
in which payment was disputed, had the properties separated for tax purposes as 
the parties intended and avoided this lawsuit. 
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clearly erroneous as the checks demonstrate no evidence of a 
meeting of the minds regarding future allocation and are 
insufficient to support a judgment. 
C. The Doctrine of Practical Construction Does Not 
Support the Trial Court's Finding of Intent 
Stangl next argues that the doctrine of practical 
construction supports the trial court's finding of intent. 
Appellee Brief, pp. 35-38. However, the doctrine of practical 
construction specifically requires that "each party shall have 
placed the same construction on the contract." Builough v. Sims. 
400 P.2d 20, 23 n.4 (Utah 1965), citing Hodges Irrigation Co. v. 
Swan Creek Canal Co.. 181 P.2d 217 (1947). In this case, the 
parties did not construe the contract the same. 
Stangl admits that the original intent of the parties was to 
have the properties separated and taxed by the authorities based 
on value. Tr. p. 11. However, he claims the intent changed and 
that the parties construed the contract to require allocation of 
taxes based upon acreage. Wade's understanding was that the 
original intent to separate the properties never changed. He 
paid taxes based upon acreage only as a temporary measure while 
waiting for Stangl to have the properties separated as originally 
planned. 
The constructions which the two parties placed upon the 
contract with respect to tax apportionment was clearly not the 
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same. Thus# the doctrine of practical construction does not 
apply and does not support the trial court's findings of intent. 
POINT VI, 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE THE PROPER 
ALLOCATION OF TAXES UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE 
CONVERSION 
Stangl attempts to rebut Wade's argument that the trial 
court was required to determine the proper allocation of taxes 
based upon the doctrine of equitable conversion by pointing to 
the arguments raised at trial. However, even if additional 
issues were litigated, the trial court was still required to 
follow the Supreme Court's instructions. As discussed in Wade's 
Appellate Brief, the Supreme Court Remittitur instructed the 
trial court to determine the taxes which were actually 
attributable to Wade's property under the doctrine of equitable 
conversion12. The trial court failed to follow these 
instructions and instead based the obligation on an alleged oral 
contract or contractual intent. This case should be remanded for 
a determination of taxes actually attributable to the property 
under the doctrine of equitable conversion as required by the 
Supreme Court. 
12 
Appellate Brief, pp. 25-18f discussing Supreme Court Remittitur, 
admitted into evidence, Tr. p.45. 
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Pertaining to Stangl's claim that the theories actually 
relied upon by the trial court were properly admitted into the 
trial, Wade admits that the issue of contractual intent was 
litigated. However, as discussed, the court's conclusion on this 
issue was clearly erroneous. 
As discussed extensively above and in Wade's Appellate 
Brief, the issues of an oral contract or oral modification of the 
existing contract were not fully litigated by the parties at 
trial as required by Rule 15(b). Therefore, these issues were 
not properly admitted and cannot form the basis for the trial 
court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing points, and the argument contained 
in the Appellant's original brief, Wade once again respectfully 
requests this Court to order appellee Stangl to convey title of 
Wade's property to him pursuant to their written contract. Wade 
also requests an order from this Court remanding this case to the 
district court with instructions to determine the proper amount 
of taxes attributable to his property under the doctrine of 
equitable conversion. Further, Wade requests this Court to 
instruct the district court to determine said taxes based upon 
the value of the respective parties' property. 
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